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Abstract 
RFID systems and equipments have many particularities and limitations which will bring a wide range 
of security issues, especially when the system contains a large number of tags and multiple readers, some 
of the traditional solutions are to be helpless. This paper presented a Hash locks improved method based 
on multi-reader, and analyzed on this method. 
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1. Introduction
EPC System Network  has become an important trend of the information networks development ,
known as the third wave of the world information industry following the computer and Internet. In the 
development of EPC System Network and market expansion, Radio Frequency Identification（RFID)
technology has become one of the critical technologies. However, as RFID technology becomes more 
widely used, especially after for the fields of electronic money proof of identity, original security 
problems of RFID technology has become more and more serious. 
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2. Security Threat 
Information collection of personal data on RFID, is possible to be used by hackers, retailers and 
government, and this will cause the RFID security and privacy threats. 
2.1. Eavesdropping   
It is designed as a RFID reader to read the tag data, the label will not refuse the RFID reader, RFID 
reader can be found as long as the way to read, in general, the label can read or not, the main control right 
is the RFID reader itself. Therefore, when the tag is read, label holders do not know at this time labels are 
being read or have been read, so it is possible read can occur in the very far distance. 
2.2. Tracking 
RFID reader can record the tag's unique ID, so if used in the battlefield, information of label holder 
will be revealed which causes the user's risk.
2.3. Forgery 
Forgery here means that if the attackers can correctly write out the text format line with RFID reader 
tag they can further deceive the RFID reader, to achieve the purpose of forgery. 
2.4. Replay attack 
Because transfer between RFID reader and Tag used the wave transmission method, such a request and 
response, will cause the data between them can easily be intercepted. As easily transmitted messages 
interception in turn causing the intercept may modify the contents of the interception, all industries 
applicatiing RFID will have a great danger. Transmiting data through encryption, even if data be get by 
people who get the data who want to intercept, information can not be related to content. 
2.5. Denial of Service 
Main intention is that requirements and response blocking between the RFiD reader and Tags. Because 
tags can not resist the request of RFID readers read the tags when the tag receives the request, the tag will 
return the data to the RFID Reader. But to consider is that the label user does not want to hold back the 
requirements of RFID Reader, because sometimes such a request, does not represent the normal 
requirements, which may be malicious request: illegal RFID Reader to read your personal data within the 
tag. To address these security issues, a variety of programs have been technically made, including killing 
tag, Faraday net cover, proactive interference, smart labels, prevent tags and Hash lock,etc.  
3. Traditional Hash lock method to resolve RFID security issues 
So far, a variety of RFID security protocols have been proposed,such as: 
3.1. Hash lock 
To avoid information leaking and were followed, metaID is used to instead real tag ID. 
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The authentication principle is as follows: reader stores the access key K of each tag, corresponding 
tag stored meta ID, which metaID = Hash (K). Reader access request is received by tag which sent 
metaID as response, reader obtained the key K corresponding with ag metaID by querying and sends it to 
the label, the label calculate the key K sent by reader through the Hash function, check the Hash (K) is 
same to metaID or not, if same, unlock, send the real tag ID to the reader. 
Fig. 1. Process of  Hash lock technology 
A low cost solution is present to address security and privacy problems in the program. It is enough for 
just a Hash value equation and metaID. But it can not avoid being tracked, because the fixed metaID, 
RFID tags response predicted and leaked in advance, and the access key K and the tag ID transmitted 
through the forward channel, it can easily be tapped by the enemy. 
3.2. Randomized Hash Lock 
Randomized Hash Lock works as follows: tag contains Hash functions and random number generator, 
back-end database to store all the tag ID. Reader requests access to tags, labels received access request, 
the Hash function to calculate the tag ID and the Hash value of random number r, generated by the 
random number generator (Hash ID i‖r). Tag sends (r, Hash (IDi‖r)) data to the requesting reader, at 
the same time, reader sent to the back-end database, back-end database exhaustive search all the Hash 
value of r, and ID tags, if Hash (IDj‖r) =Hash (IDi‖r),IDj is corresponding label ID. Tag unlock , 
received IDj sent by the reader. 
Fig. 2. Process of Randomized Hash Lock 
4. Hash Lock improved method based on multi readers 
Hash lock through simple Hash function, increasing state of locking and unlocking to access the 
communication between tags and readers; but it can not solve the problem of location privacy and the 
middle attack. Randomized Hash Lock method avoids the shortcomings of being tracked; However, this 
method is only suitable for a few users of RFID. When the system contains a large number of tags and 
multiple readers, Hash Lock and Randomized Hash Lock were helpless. This paper presents a Hash Lock 
improved method based on multi readers to solve this problem. 
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4.1. Working Principle 
The reader want to query tag ID.When the system has multiple readers, these readers may have the 
same or different ReaderID, when they have different ReaderID, the tags need to determine the reader is 
certified or not. If the reader has been certified, the tag response to the reader for it obtain their IDs. 
Reader certification 
The readers and tags determine the certification system before responding to reader and let the reader 
get tag ID information. Because the ReaderID of readers stored in the tag RAM in advance, so the 
competent reader is identified by tag through the reader ID. Tag does not respond to the reader without 
permission, so the enemy can not track (because all the readers have access). In addition, this authority 
control process is based on generated random numbers, therefore, also can prevent the enemy's trick. 
When the RFID tag receives the reader request, the random number k generated and sent to reader , 
reader received and sent it back to reader database, back-end database comput a (k) = Hash (ReaderID‖k) 
and sent a (k) back to the reader, then the reader sent a (k) to the label. At the same time, RFID tags also 
calculate Hash (ReaderID‖k), and then tag compare a (k) values calculated by tag and reader are equal 
or not. If equal, the reader pass the certification and label will send it some related information of Tag ID; 
if not equal, the reader is not certified to be shielded. 
Fig. 3. Process of Hash Lock improved method based on multi readers 
Get TagID 
After the reader certification, RFID tags respond to the authentication reader Hash (TagID). When the 
reader receives the Hash (TagID) value, it will communicate with the back-end database and search for 
data (TagID, Hash (TagID)), readers will get the corresponding TagIDs. Even if the Hash (TagID) value 
is tapped, when the label sends its value, the eavesdropper does not know the Hash value, because he can 
not determine the relationship between TagID and Hash (TagID). 
To update and certification the ReaderID in the RFID tag memory 
When an object from one warehouse to another warehouse, the certified readers change from the 
previous warehouse for the current reader. Reader access to Hash (TagID) value and pass it into 
background database, the database notice ReaderID updates stored in the tags. Accordingly, the database 
find out the New ReaderID and pass it to the reader. When the reader receives the New ReaderID , it and 
OldReaderID are "XOR" and the " XOR " value is sent to the RF tag.  
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Tags can draw New ReaderID from the "xor" value and the Old ReaderID, at last ReaderID will be 
updated.  
In ReaderID update process, even though the "xor" values are compromised, the enemy can not get 
New ReaderID. Because they can not get Old ReaderID, thus the trick prevent.  
4.2. Advantages 
To prevent eavesdropping 
During the certification process, even if the enemy eavesdrop the output a (k), it can not be certified in 
the next step. Because the certification process requires for each a (k) values are changing. Previous 
certification a (k) values  is meaningless for the latter certification. When certification is completed, the 
RF tag output Hash (TagID) rather than TagID. Hash equation is difficult to find its inverse function, so 
even if the enemy capture the output Hash (TagID) value, can not get the TagID. In short, even when the 
communication between the reader and RFID tag eavesdropped, the above method is also safe. 
To prevent tracking 
RFID tags only response for certified reader. Because there is no label output, so the enemy can not 
track tags to track what is customer paid. Location privacy and guests belongings are protected.  
Low computation load  
The improved method has fast speed and low cost. When a RFID tag identificated from the N RFID 
tags, the reader need only perform 1 operation and N times Hash ID searches, while Randomized Hash 
Lock method requires at least N times Hash operations and N times ID searches. Apparently, on the same 
security level, the proposed method significantly reduce the load.  
For a large number of RFID tags 
Because the calculation load is low, and as the number of radio tags increase slowly, so the method is 
suitable for RFID systems with a large number of tags which need to be protected. 
5. Conclusion 
Random Hash Lock improved method is for systems with multiple readers and a large number of tags 
such as logistics management. In the future, security will be the focus of RFID development and one of 
the key success factors.  
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